Managing the risks of 2nd pillar pension schemes; the situation in the former Yugoslavia and Albania by Vonk, G.J.
  
 University of Groningen





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2007
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Vonk, G. J. (2007). Managing the risks of 2nd  pillar pension schemes; the situation in the former
Yugoslavia and Albania. www.coe.int.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the











anaging the risks of mandatory  2nd pillar pension 





A CARDS/SISP report, June 2007 
 




1. Subject matter, purpose and structure of the report 
 
During the transition period, most countries in central and eastern Europe 
introduced major changes to their pension systems. These reforms not only 
brought about adjustments in the pre-existing  pay-as-you-go-systems (PAYG), 
but also the introduction of funded pension schemes, as well as the emergence of 
an array of voluntary pension arrangements.  
 
In the countries/territories under investigation various reform paths have been 
chosen. Croatia,  Macedonia  and Kosovo all introduced mandatory funded 
pension schemes as part of a multi pillar pension system. These schemes are 
referred to as second pillar pension schemes. In Macedonia the new system 
became fully operational in 2007. In Croatia en Kosovo the new system entered 
into force in  2002 and 2003.   
 
Serbia and Montenegro do not contemplate the introduction of a funded system as 
part of a multi pillar system in the near future. It is felt that the  poor economic 
outlook and the unfavourable standard of living of the people in these countries 
do not allow for such a change.  
 
Albania  introduced a new pension system in 1993 as part of a new 
comprehensive social insurance scheme. The system operates on the pay-as-you-
go principle and offers a mix of compulsory, voluntary and supplementary 
pensions. However, the pension system is under much strain and it is reported that 
the Albanian government will take a decision in this year as to introduction of a 
second pillar pension.  
 
Funded pension systems offer all sorts of advantages compared to systems which 
are solely based upon the pay-as-you-go-principle The financial burden is shifted 
to another generation and funded systems include the promise of higher 
replacement rates. But there also certain flaws attached to second pillar pensions. 
For example, the levels of benefit are dependent upon the return of investments 
which may not always be prosperous and which may fluctuate, giving rise to 
differences in entitlements, not only in time but also between funds. Unless the 
state imposes a strict regulatory regime, individuals may be exposed to high risks.  
 
This report focuses upon the disadvantages of  a mandatory second pillar system 
and the way these can be addressed. The instructions for this report as presented 
by the Cards/Sisp programme read as follows: 
 
One has to be attentive to the issue raised by compelling people to choose (possibly without good 
knowledge) and their choice resulting in substantially different outcomes. Are there guarantees to 
be built in or even equalisation mechanisms? In so far people have a choice as to the pension 
institution to take care of their compulsory second (and sometime also first plus pillar), it would be 
interesting to see what is guiding their choice.  Freedom of choice without good information is 
indeed a game of chance. Should social security force people to gamble? What information should 
in any case be provided? What are the best practices to be followed?” 
 
The implementation of funding systems also relies on optimism of the insured people about the 
rate of return and adjustment may need to be made in the future for example by raising the 
contribution rate. What commitments can a state take up in this respect? The success of funding 
systems is also tightly linked with the growth of the economy, fiscal stability, and needs to be 
managed by an efficient administration system with a close supervision of the state which will 
have, in case of financial crisis, to guarantee a minimum amount of pension benefits in order to 
avoid social crisis. 
 
The foregoing instructions suggest a normative approach. If the state makes the 
payment of contributions for a second pillar pension obligatory,  it should at least 
offer some guarantees that the system is transparent for the citizens, that it is 
managed properly and that the risk of  failing returns on investments is 
minimized. The purpose of this report is to investigate to what extent pension 
systems of the countries involved live up to this standard.  
 
In paragraph two the above normative proposition will be worked out from a  
theoretical point of view. What are the recognized disadvantages of a funded 
pension system and to what extend must  the state be held responsible for 
addressing these disadvantages? The paragraph concludes with a summary of 
general standards that states should take into account when introducing mandatory 
second pillar pensions. 
 
Paragraph three deals with the questions regarding the extent to which the newly 
introduced pension schemes in the countries involved live up to the standards 
formulated in the previous paragraph.  
 
Finally, paragraph four contains a summary and some recommendations for the 
countries involved. 
 
The country analysis contained in the paper is necessarily confined to Croatia, 
Kosovo and Macedonia, since these are the only countries/territories to have 
adopted a mandatory second pillar scheme. Unfortunately, insufficient 
information was available as to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For this 
reason I have decided not include these territories. With regard to Croatia and 
Kosovo I was  pleased to find that the pension reforms in these 
countries/territories have been extensively evaluated by the World Bank;  much 
information (in the English language) is available about the second pillar pension 
and the quality of the regulatory and supervisory framework. This is (as yet) not 
the case for Macedonia. The Macedonian conclusions drawn in the report are 
therefore sketchy and provisional.   
 
The report draws its information from the various reports composed by local and 
EU experts within the framework of the CARDS-SISP project. These are the so-
called Annexes. With regard to the general analysis adopted in the second part, I 
made use of a number of OECD and World Bank reports, in particular the 
comprehensive World Bank publication of Robert Holzmann and Richard Hinz, 
Old age income support in de 21-ste century, an international perspective of 
pension systems and reform, 2005. This report contains a separate chapter on the 
situation in central and eastern Europe. 
 
2. The role of the state in managing the risks of mandatory second pillar 
pensions 
 
Defining ‘ mandatory  second pillar pensions’ 
The term “second pillar” pension scheme is connected to the three pillar model 
advocated by the World Bank in the report Averting the old age crisis, published 
in 1994. The three pillars consist of: 
a. a mandated, unfunded and publicly managed defined benefit system  
b. a mandated, funded and privately managed defined contribution system 
c. a voluntary retirement system 
 
The multi-pillar system presented in this way is merely a theoretical model. In 
reality, the design of pension systems is very diversified. It reflects political 
choices, historical traditions and the specific economic challenges faced by the 
different countries. Such a situation easily gives rise to conceptual confusion as to 
the meaning of the concepts: first, second an third pillar schemes. For example in 
many Western European countries the term second pillar is often associated with 
the supplementary pension schemes set up under collective labour agreements. In 
some countries such collective schemes have a semi public character and the 
affiliation of the employers and employees may be rendered obligatory by law. In 
other countries the collective schemes are set up on a strictly private basis, while 
participation is not necessarily obligatory. 
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, the present report employs the theoretical 
concept of second pillar pensions, as originally proposed by the World Bank. In 
other words it refers to schemes, which are  
- obligatory for the participants 
- based upon the capitalisation method (as opposed to the pay-as-you-go-
principle) 
- managed by funds which operate under private law 
- based upon the defined contribution principle 
 
As we will see below,  the recently introduced secondary pillar pensions of the 
three countries/territories under consideration (Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia) 
largely reflect these characteristics.  
 
Disadvantages and shortcomings 
The call for second pillar pensions in Central and Eastern Europe is a direct 
reaction to the shortcomings of pre-existing pay-as-you-go-schemes in the 
changing economies in this region. During the early transition period all the 
countries had to react to pressures arising from a shrinking base of contributions 
and a growing population of beneficiaries, both of which were the result of 
contractions in economic activity. Non-compliance exacerbated the problem. 
Persons are not inclined to pay high contributions when the system fails to deliver 
the promise of adequate pension entitlements. The story is that of a vicious circle. 
Once the participation rate starts to diminish, the problem gets even worse until  
the sustainability of the entire system is called into question.  
 
Second pillar pensions are intended to solve the crisis. These schemes allow 
individuals to contribute toward their own future pensions payments, so that 
individual contributions plus any investment gains add up to the future pension 
payment stream. The promise of higher replacement rates should bring back the 
confidence in the system,  which in turn should have a favourable effect on the 
participation rate. Another advantage of such a system is that there is no direct 
dependence on new generations or cohorts being strong enough to finance 
previous ones. The intrinsic problem that pertains to funded schemes, namely that 
persons are not financially capable or willing to contribute can be overcome, by 
making the system mandatory. 
 
While a shift towards a mandatory funded scheme addresses the crisis in the first 
pillar pension scheme, it also presents a number of  problems. Here I will present 
a general overview of the risks that are frequently referred to in literature.  
 
The rights of the elderly generations 
The first problem is a transitional one: the funded system will only benefit 
future generations. This gives rise to the question of how to address the 
rights of elderly workers and pensioners.  
 
Failing administration 
Without measures to counterbalance the risks, a fully private system of 
funded pensions, may eventually lead to the creation of inefficient firms, 
corrupted funds or to the concentration of capital in the hands of a select 
few. The experiences of some pension funds in the US (Enron) and the 
UK (Maxwell) are all too well known. A further question is whether a 
country’s financial infrastructure and political economy can live up to the 
task of introducing second pillar pensions. Not all countries have good 
experiences in this respect. For example in Poland, the administrative 
apparatus of the social security institution was unable to deal with a timely 
transfer of contributions to private pension funds, and a debt to the funds 
was accumulated. In Hungary, the government reversed the decision to 
increase the size of the funded pillar and allowed the participants to move 
back to the pay-as-you-go system, creating uncertainty as to the fiscal 
liability of government and undermining the credibility of the new system  
In other words the reform not only requires a strong regulatory capacity 
but also a stable political and financial infrastructure. 
 
Market failure 
As a funded pension scheme accumulates capital, it is possible to invest 
this capital over a longer period of time, the profits of which can be used 
for propping up the level op the pensions. By their very nature, market-
driven returns will vary from period to period. The result is that the returns 
of the funded pensions may fall below the expectations. This risk is so 
much inherent to the second pillar pensions, that it can hardly be perceived 
as a disadvantage. Nonetheless, the less governments are capable of 
introducing a sound regulatory and supervisory mechanism, the more the 
system becomes susceptible to market failures and the more the individual 
becomes exposed to risks. Without such machinery the risks for the 
individual may be simply  too high. The experiences of many British 
people who were first encouraged to opt out of the state system scheme in 
favour of personal pension accounts and who then saw their savings 
disappear during  the collapse of the market after 9/11 tell the story. 
 
Lack of transparency  
This issue arises in countries which allow insured persons to choose to 
affiliate themselves to different private investment funds: on the basis of 
what criteria do they choose? If the ‘clients’ are fully dependent upon the 
information provided by the private funds, which have a commercial 
interest in attracting their capital, there is the risk that they make the 
wrong choices on the basis of which their original expectations are not 
met. Clearly, the Estonian case, where pension funds have reportedly 
resorted to creative advertisements tricks in order to attract customers, 
such as the participation in a lottery to win a holiday trip1, is somewhat 
disconcerting in this respect.   
 
Managing the risks of mandatory second pillar pension schemes 
If the introduction of the mandatory second pillar pension schemes would be 
allowed to take place without any form of government control, i.e. in a situation 
of fully fledged privatisation of public pension schemes, all the above risks and 
disadvantages are likely to occur. It is submitted that such a form of privatisation 
is therefore contrary to concept of the right to social security as being a 
fundamental right. This right presupposes a final responsibility of the state 
towards a properly functioning pension system which gives rise to adequate 
entitlements that are available for all. Thus the introduction of second pillar 
pensions must necessarily give rise to a public regulatory mechanism which is 
capable of managing the risks referred to above.  
 
On the basis of this submission a set of minimal criteria can be developed to 
which the states must adhere. It is then possible to test whether the countries 
under consideration comply with these criteria. The minimal requirements are 
these: 
                                                 
1
 Lauri Leppik, Success factors in pension reform, Bratislava, 2004, 
www.praxis.ee/data/Success_factors_of_the_pension_reform.pdf 
 a. The introduction of  the mandatory second pillar pension schemes must be 
accompanied by transitional arrangements which take into account the 
interests of the elderly generation and the existing pensioners. (standard a: 
a proper transitional regime) 
b. The state must introduce a regulatory and supervisory mechanism which 
should oversee and control the governance, accountability, and investment 
practices of the private actors, with a view to: 
o minimizing the risks for individuals of market failure 
o preventing mal practices and failures to comply with obligations vis á 
vis the beneficiaries (standard b a proper regulatory and supervisory 
mechanism) 
c. The state must make sure that the insured persons are objectively informed 
about the consequences of their choices, for example for specific pension 
funds or investment arrangements (standard c: objective information) 
 
3. The Second pillar pension schemes in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia 
 
3.1 The situation in Croatia 
 
The system 
A three pillar pension system was introduced through the Pension Insurance Act of 
1998 and the law on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds of 1999. The Pension 
Insurance Act paved the way for a mandatory second pillar pension to supplement the 
pay-as-you-go burden on the Pension Fund by partly substituting it with a privatised 
defined contribution system. The new system, which entered into force in 2002,  is 
based upon individual contributions to a private capital account held with a licensed 
private pension fund.  
 
Standard a: a proper transitional regime 
The introduction of the second pillar was accompanied by a balanced transitional 
regime. At its point of introduction in 2002 all employees under 40 years of age were 
required to become members of one of the new private pension funds that had been 
established. For those under 40 years of age participation is compulsory. For those 
between 40 and 50 years of age at the time of the introduction of the scheme, 
participation was voluntary, but irrevocable. It follows that those who are 50 years of 
age and older remain dependent upon the first pillar pension scheme. The extent to 
which this scheme continues to treat this generation justly has been called into 
question by a number of pension cuts which occurred during the nineteen-nineties. 
The cuts, sometimes  referred to as the so called ‘pensioners’ debt’, resulted from the  
fact that between 1993 and 1998  pensions were no longer indexed according to rises 
in wage levels, but ad hoc to price level changes. As a result, the real value of the 
pension decline considerably. The cuts have been successfully challenged before the 
Constitutional Court  and the pensioners’ debt was partly reimbursed by the previous 
government. The present government is reported to be committed to paying back the 
remaining debt.2  On the whole, it can be said that despite (or perhaps rather thanks 
to) a number of reform measures at the end of the nineteen-nineties, that first pillar 
system still stands firmly. 
 
Standard 2: a proper regulatory and supervisory mechanism 
Private pension funds are regulated by the supervisory Agency for Pension Funds and 
Insurance (HAGENA), which was established in 2001. HAGENA is responsible for 
developing the regulations, which will govern the operations of the second and third 
pillar pension funds, licensing and authorization of the private pension funds, and 
supervision and monitoring the funds. Seven private pension funds were established 
in 2001 of which four funds have survived in operation, most of which are at least 
partially owned by financial institutions of EU Member States. The funds’ 
performance is monitored on a daily basis and there are no current anxieties about the 
effective operation of the system. The Croatian Pension Reform has been extensively 
evaluated by the World Bank in 2003.3 With regard to the regulatory and supervisory 
framework, the report has highlighted a number of weak points which need further 
revision and/or close monitoring. The conclusions seems to be that when these 
elements are properly addressed the framework satisfies the requirements.  
 
Standard c: objective information 
An intensive and broad public education and information campaign was an important 
element of the pension reform in Croatia. Due to the high sensitivity of pension issues 
and the general distrust of the broad public towards the pension system itself, initial 
PR efforts during the legislation building process in 1998 was aimed at educating 
people with regards to the basic concepts of a three-pillar system, explaining the 
necessity to revise the parameters and downscale the first pillar, and presenting 
expectations regarding the introduction of the mandatory second pillar. In the first 
period, the public campaign was oriented towards education about the second pillar 
and promotion of a funded pension system. From November 2001, the focus was on 
information about individual account registration processes for mandatory 
participants and particularly the population between 40 and 50 years of age who 
could have an option of joining the second pillar. In order to provide them with a tool 
to make a qualified choice, HAGENA made available and publicized a computer 
program for calculating expected pension levels in the new system versus the levels 
in the old system In the period between November 2001 and June 2002 there were 
almost 90,000 visits to the web site, most of which in order to use the pension 
calculator. On the basis of the foregoing information derived from the World Bank 
evaluation of the Croatian Pension Reform4, it seems that Croatia has lived up to the 
standard of objective information. 
 
                                                 
2
  According to the information contained in the Croation Annexes   
3
 Zoran Anusic, Phillip O’Keefe and Sanja Madzarevic-Sujster, Pension Reform in Croatia, World Bank, 
2003. 
4
  Zoran Anusic, Phillip O’Keefe and Sanja Madzarevic-Sujster, Pension Reform in Croatia, World Bank, 
2003, 37. 
 
 3.2 The situation in Kosovo 
 
The system 
In 2002 Kosovo introduced an entirely multi pillar system. The first pillar is set along 
the lines of a social pension. Its introduction became necessary in view of the fact that 
the former Yugoslavian pensions were not being paid out, one of the reasons being 
that most of the pension records had been lost during the war. The basic pension  
provides flat rate benefits to guarantee a minimum standard of living for all Kosovan 
residents, financed out of the state budget. Entitlement is solely based upon a person’s 
age. The interruption of employment status is not required either. The mandatory 
second pillar pension is based upon the defined contribution system. There is no 
choice between different private pension funds. Instead the fund is administered by 
the Kosovo Pension Saving Trust (KPST). It has seven members, the majority of 
which are professionals). All contributions are transferred to the Trust, which is 
responsible for tracking contributions, investing pension assets and arranging for the 
payment of pensions. All assets are invested abroad. The Trust creates an individual 
account for each participant, and credits the account accordingly throughout the 
working life of the participants. At retirement, the balance of funds in an individual’s 
account is to be used to buy an annuity, provided that the accumulated balance is 
sufficient to meet the minimum threshold. Otherwise, the payment takes place as a 
lump sum benefit. The savings program was implemented in two phases. In August 
2002, contributions became mandatory for employees in the public sector, public 
enterprises, socially owned enterprises an private enterprises with more than 500 
employees. In August 2003, the mandatory component of the program was extended 
to cover all workers, including the self employed. 
 
Standard a: a proper transitional regime 
Due to the unique circumstances in Kosovo which led to the immediate introduction 
of a first pillar social pension, problems in this sphere do not occur. A prerequisite is 
that the social pension will continue to deliver adequate minimum pensions in the 
future. This will largely depend on the available tax resources and future political 
development.  
 
Standard b: a proper regulatory and supervisory machinery 
The Kosovo Pension Savings Trust was created with the sole mandate of 
administering the saving pension program in the interests of contributors. In order to 
ensure objectivity and compliance with fiduciary responsibilities KPST was 
established as an independent trust, with the power to manage and invest funds 
prudently for participants and free from political interference. At present all four 
professional board members are filled by foreign experts, while the two representative 
member positions are filled by domestic experts. A first assessment of the overall 
governance of KPST indicates that it is soundly administered.5 The authority to 
regulate KPST rests with the overall regulator of financial services in Kosovo. This 
                                                 
5
 John Gubbels, David Snelbecker and Lena Zezulin, The Kosovo pension reform: achievements and 
lessons, World Bank, 2005, 34 
authority has far ranging powers that allow it to oversee the operation of the Trust to 
ensure that the interests of the participants are met. The World Bank qualifies the 
supervisory and regulatory framework of the saving pension program as “strong”.6 
 
Standard c: objective information 
Since Kosovo participants do no have to make any personal choices in the second 
pillar, this standard is not relevant. 
 
3.3 The situation in Macedonia 
 
The system 
In Macedonia pension reform was initiated in 1997 and in 2000 the Pension and 
Disability Insurance Law was adopted. This reform allowed for the introduction of a 
mandatory second pillar pension system to supplement the first pillar pensions. The 
second pillar has only recently become operational. In Macedonia the first and second 
pillars are strongly integrated. Under the previous pension system, the employer paid 
21.2% of each employee’s salary to the Fund for Pension and Disability Insurance of 
Macedonia – PDIF. In the reformed system the same contribution will be paid. In the 
meanwhile two private pension funds have been established. Employees will be 
covered by both the PDIF and one of these two private pension funds. The total of 
21,2% contribution is divided into two parts: 13,78% will remain in PDIF and 7,42% 
will be transferred to an individual account in the chosen private pension fund. All 
those employed after 1 January 2003 are obligated to switch to the two-pillar system. 
Those who join the two pillar pension system by joining a private pension fund will 
receive a combined pension from the PDIF and from the accumulated assets from the 
Pension Fund on their individual account at the time of retirement 
 
Standard a: a proper transitional regime 
All persons employed after 1 January 2003 are obligated to switch to the two-pillar 
system. Those employed before this date will be given the opportunity to choose 
whether they want to do this or remain in the first pillar system. For those employees 
who remain in the first pillar pension system, the pension and disability insurance is 
covered solely by the PDIF, and there will be no changes to the way they built up a 
pension. The protection of the elderly generation is secured through a general  
instrument for setting minimum pensions.. The minimum amount of old age pension  
from compulsory pension and disability pension together with the pension from the 
second pillar system cannot be lower that the determined average wage of all 
employees in the previous year. These levels are 41% for beneficiaries with an 
insurance period of more than 35 years (male) or more than 30 years (female), 38% 
(30; 25) and 35% (25; 20). If the insured person does not reach these insurance 
periods, the state subsidizes the rest of the amount.  
 
Standard b: a proper regulatory and supervisory mechanism 
                                                 
6
 John Gubbels, David Snelbecker and Lena Zezulin, The Kosovo pension reform: achievements and 
lessons, World Bank, 2005, 2. 
 
Contrary to Croatia and Kosovo, the strength of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework has as yet not been evaluated by the World Bank, at least not visibly for 
the general public. At the time of writing not much information in the English 
language is available about the specific lay out of the framework. What is clear 
though is that MAPAS is the agency encharged with the regulation and supervision of 
the fully funded pension insurance. According to MAPAS the regulatory and 
supervisory framework is based upon the following principles: 
• Complete separation of pension fund assets from the assets of the pension 
companies that govern these funds 
• Clear and strictly defined rules and limitations with regard to the investment of 
assets 
• Government guarantees of an 80% coverage of private pension funds assets in the 
case of fraud or theft 
• Regular supervision of pension system institutions by the Government and high 
fines for any illegal activities undertaken 
Further information as to the quality of the regulation and the implementation of these 
principles is required in order to be able to conclude that Macedonia satisfies the 
regulatory and supervisory standard. 
 
Standard c: objective information 
This responsibility is fully taken up by MAPAS which seems to run an active public 
information campaign. 
 
4.  Summary and conclusions 
 
In the countries/territories under investigation various reform paths have been chosen.  
Croatia,  Macedonia  and Kosovo all introduced mandatory funded pension schemes 
as part of a multi pillar pension system. These schemes are referred to as second pillar 
pension schemes. In Macedonia the new system has become fully operational in 
2007. In Croatia and Kosovo the new system entered into force in  2002 and 2003. 
Other countries/territories in the region have not (yet) introduced second pillar 
pension schemes.  
 
Mandatory second pillar systems offer all sorts of advantages, especially when they 
are introduced to supplement first pillar pay-as-you-go arrangements. However there 
are also certain disadvantages. This report focuses on these disadvantages. The first 
part (paragraph 2) describes the generally recognized weaknesses and formulates 
three standards to which states must adhere in addressing these. 
 
The weakness are: 
- the rights of the elderly generations (not fully included in the second pillar) 
- failing administration 
- market failure 
- lack of transparency 
 
The standards are: 
a. The introduction of the mandatory second pillar pension schemes must be 
accompanied by transitional arrangements which take into account the 
interests of the elderly generation and the existing pensioners. (standard a: a 
proper transitional regime) 
b. The state must introduce a regulatory and supervisory mechanism which 
should oversee and control the governance, accountability, and investment 
practices of the private actors, with a view to 
o minimizing the risks for individuals of market failure 
o preventing mal practices and failures to comply with obligations vis a 
vis the beneficiaries (standard b a proper regulatory and supervisory 
mechanism) 
c. The state must make sure that the insured persons are objectively informed 
about the consequences of their choices, for example for specific pension 
funds or investment arrangements (standard c: objective information) 
 
In the second part (paragraph 3), the second pillar pension systems of Croatia, 




- Standard a: after a period of severe problems in maintaining the levels of the 
first pillar pensions the situation is now stabilized, promising a reasonable 
basis for those who cannot fully enjoy second pillar pensions 
- Standard b: the World Bank has evaluated the system and has highlighted a 
number of weak points which need further revision and/or close monitoring. 
The conclusions seem to be that when these elements are properly addressed 
the framework satisfies the requirements 
- Standard c: fully satisfied 
 
2. .Kosovo 
- Standard a: the first pillar social pension offers a safety net for all.  A 
prerequisite is that the social pension will continue to deliver adequate 
minimum pensions in the future. This will largely depend on the available tax 
resources and future political development.  
- Standard b: the administration of the Kosovan second pillar is placed in the 
hands of a professional board. The regulatory and supervisory system is seen 
as strong. 
- Standard c: not relevant 
 
3. Macedonia 
- Standard a: fully satisfied through a combined first and second pillar 
minimum pension regime 
- Standard b: there is supervisory and regulatory framework but its quality has 
not yet been publicly evaluated. More information is needed to draw any 
conclusions. 
- Standard c: seems to be satisfied. 
  
 
